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Chapter 2  
Taking accountability into account: the debate so far 
Peter Newell  
Accountability is a perpetual struggle when power is delegated by the many to the few in 
the interests of governability.... To these perennial problems, globalisation and political 
liberalisation have added new ones. Powerful non-state actors capable of influencing the 
lives of ordinary people have multiplied, often act with impunity across borders and can 
evade the reach of conventional state-based accountability systems. (Goetz and Jenkins 
2004: 1) 
 
The idea that accountability is central to ensuring that political and market institutions 
respond to the needs of the poor has acquired the status of a 'given' in mainstream 
development orthodoxy. However, the popularity of the term in contemporary 
development debates, devoid of an analysis of the power relations that it assumes, will do 
little to help us understand the ways in which institutional and market failure and abuses 
of power impact upon the lives of the poor. Though it has some potential to identify and 
challenge the circuits of power that maintain and validate social exclusion and inequity, 
the way accountability is currently understood and promoted in development debates is as 
likely to reinforce hierarchy and marginalisation and miss important opportunities to 
generate change. Politicising the term, on the other hand, provides for a more 
fundamental set of conversations about power in development, for whom it is exercised, 
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how and with what consequences. Such a shift brings to our attention how the webs of 
accountability that flow between dispersed and disaggregated decision makers and 
decision takers graft on to the changing relations between state, market and society. It 
allows us to ask:  
 
• what is accountability for? (what broader political ends does it serve);  
• who is it for? (who benefits, who articulates those claims, who bears rights 
to accountability);  
• how is it practised? (through what means and processes);  
• where is it practised? (in which sites and across what levels of political 
decision making).  
 
Each of these questions is intimately connected to the others and implies a 
different set of strategies and claim making, as the discussion below reveals. At the same 
time, each allows us to explore different and volatile dimensions of the accountability 
debate. Goetz and Jenkins (2004: 4) argue, for example, that it is the dimension of the 
debate around 'for what' the powerful are being held to account that is being most 
dramatically reinvented, as expectations proliferate about the functions of governance 
and the standards by which performance of these obligations should be judged. As we see 
in the section of the book on corporate accountability, this is as true of corporate actors 
(amid claims about their broader responsibilities to society) as it is of the state. Impact 
upon a community's human development, rather than compliance with narrowly defined 
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financial and technical rules, is increasingly relevant as a standard of accountability for 
judging the private sector. Posing these critical questions provides a starting point for 
reclaiming the transformative potential of ideas about accountability to change structures 
and relations of power, and not merely to consolidate the power of the already powerful 
through better systems of reporting and auditing that validate their actions and omissions.  
  
The argument developed in this chapter is, first, that the ability to demand and exercise 
accountability implies power. The right to demand and the capacity and willingness to 
respond to calls for accountability assume relations of power. This seemingly obvious 
observation is at odds with much of the contemporary debate, which seeks to render 
accountability claims manageable by reducing them to improved systems of management 
and auditing. Second, these power relations are in a state of flux, reflecting the contested 
basis of relations between the state, civil society and market actors. These relations both 
create and restrict the possibilities of new forms of accountability by generating new 
dynamics of power through material change and changes in the organisation of political 
authority.  
 
Beyond these material and political shifts, at a discursive level we find that exercises of 
power are justified and advanced by prevailing constructions of accountability and the 
entitlements they presume. These narratives, which are the product of a particular set of 
historical and material circumstances, validate some forms of power and delegitimise 
others. The interaction between political action, material change and discursive practices 
is what helps us to understand the distinct expressions of accountability politics explored 
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in this book – in diverse settings and issue arenas, and as they are applied to different 
actors. These interactions also provide the basis for understanding the place of 
accountability in broader constructions of citizenship and discourses around rights, who 
gets to define these, and the implications of this for the poor. Challenging prevailing 
conceptions of accountability means engaging with change at the material, organisational 
and discursive levels that define the possibilities of alternative accountabilities. 
 
Conceptualising accountability  
 
In so far as an enquiry into the practice of accountability in development is an enquiry 
into how to control the exercise of power, we can view contemporary debates as a 
continuation of concerns that have driven political philosophy for several hundred years. 
Beginning with the ancient philosophers, political thinkers have been concerned to 
prevent abuses by restraining power within established rules. In contemporary usage, the 
notion of accountability continues to express this concern, attempting to apply checks, 
oversight and institutional constraints on the exercise of power. It implies both a measure 
of answerability (providing an account of actions undertaken) and enforceability 
(punishment or sanctions for poor or illegal performance) (Schedler et al. 1999). In its 
broadest sense, then, accountability is about the construction of a grammar of conduct 
and performance and the standards used to assess them (Day and Klein 1987).  
 
During the last decade, the language of accountability has gained increasing prominence 
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in development debates (Newell and Bellour 2002). Appropriated by a myriad of 
international donor and academic discourses, accountability has become a malleable and 
often nebulous concept, with connotations that change with the context and agenda. The 
widespread use of the term means that ‘its field of application is as broad as its potential 
for consensus’ (Schedler 1999: 13). It represents, nevertheless, 'an under-explored 
concept whose meaning remains evasive, whose boundaries are fuzzy and whose internal 
structure is confusing' (ibid.). For Brinkerhoff, the worrying implication of the lack of 
conceptual and analytical clarity is that 'Accountability risks becoming another buzzword 
in a long line of ineffectual quick fixes’ (2004: 372). Its prevalent use in recent years can 
be explained by shifts in the strategic thinking of key development agencies with regard 
to the state, in particular, and the importance of creating mechanisms of accountability to 
citizens of the state (Goetz and Gaventa 2001). Though the term accountability generally 
refers to holding actors responsible for their actions, questions such as accountability for 
what, by whom, and to whom immediately arise (Cornwall, Lucas and Pasteur 2000). 
This, indeed, has been the entry point of the contributors to this book, who pose questions 
about accountability in exactly these terms. 
 
Rather than attempting to formulate another definition of accountability or to refine one 
of the many existing formulations, in this book we have sought to interpret the conflicts 
of power through multiple lenses of accountability which derive from the contexts in 
which they are situated. There is no global grammar of accountability that makes sense 
across settings. The diversity of struggles explored in this book demonstrates the different 
expectations, histories and values that people bring to bear upon understandings of the 
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respective rights, duties and responsibilities of social actors. Even agreeing a common 
working understanding of the term among the contributors to this book was a difficult 
task: for example, the very term accountability does not exist in Spanish. It is clearly a 
malleable and evolving concept that has to be understood in relation to the conflicts and 
struggles it is being used to describe. The following section explores some of the macro 
manifestations of shifting understandings of accountability politics.  
 
Shifting accountabilities  
 
In so far as accountability implies practices of power, it is unsurprising that its ideas and 
ideologies are promoted, sustained and contested by competing political actors. These 
discourses generate expectations, duties and conduct that change the practice of 
accountability politics. The historical and material context in which they are produced 
ensures that they relate strongly to the structures and actors that generate them. In this 
sense the construction of accountabilities, the definition of the rights and duties that flow 
from relations of accountability, is fundamentally a political process driven by broader 
economic and political agendas. For example, the predominant focus on state 
accountability can be understood in the light of prevailing notions about the appropriate 
relationship between states and markets, and assumptions within neoliberal ideology 
about the inefficiency and lack of responsiveness of states to the needs of citizens, 
defined as consumers.  
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From states… 
 
From being the traditional subjects for the application of political and fiscal 
accountability measures, states are also becoming the principal targets for improving the 
responsiveness of services to the poor. In the case of health sector reform, Brinkerhoff 
notes that concern with accountability derives from ‘dissatisfaction with health system 
performance ... costs, quality assurance, service availability ... financial mismanagement 
and corruption and lack of responsiveness' (2004: 371). This market rationale for 
accountability is apparent in the way state functions are often equated with ‘service 
delivery’, a move which makes it easier for market advocates to argue that private actors 
may be able to provide the same services more cost-effectively and efficiently. As state 
service delivery systems have become more complex and as providers’ roles have 
changed, it has become more difficult to assign responsibility, however. With service 
provision being increasingly shared with other actors, the boundaries of state 
accountability are blurring, as we see in Chapter 4 on water provision.  
 
Since initial conceptualisations of accountability have been derived from ways to 
improve state mechanisms, policies and processes, it is unsurprising that current debates 
should reflect and focus upon state-based notions of accountability. Indeed states remain 
the predominant reference point in debates about accountability and development despite 
the fact that accountability demands are increasingly made of non-state actors. The 
rhetoric of public accountability has grown with the increasing popularity of new public 
management approaches and renewed attention to state bureaucracy and administration 
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associated with the ‘good governance’ agenda pursued by donors (Considine 2002). 
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the concepts of 
responsiveness, accountability and transparency are among the core characteristics of 
good governance (UNDP 1997: 4). The turn back towards viewing the state as a key actor 
in development was in many ways led by the World Bank in its 1997 World Development 
Report, on ‘The State in a Changing World’ (World Bank 1997). Since then there has 
been repeated emphasis on enhancing accountability through increased state 
responsiveness.  
 
Contemporary discourses of democracy have also highlighted the importance of state 
accountability to wider processes of democratisation (Luckham and White 1996). By 
promoting free and fair elections and mechanisms to hold governments accountable to 
their publics, international donors have emphasised themes of democratic governance 
(UNDP 1997: 3). While concepts of public accountability have long been associated with 
democratic theory and practice, the contemporary wave of transitions from authoritarian 
rule to democratic governance has highlighted the importance of answerability and 
enforcement mechanisms in new democracies (Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler 1998). These 
trends have shown that without systems providing ‘credible restraints’ on power, many 
democratic regimes remain ‘low-quality’. If deficiencies in accountability structures are 
often more visible in new democracies, demands for public accountability in old and new 
democratic states share a core assumption that elections are, by themselves, no guarantee 
of good governance. The experience of many new democracies provides evidence of this, 
as many continue to be haunted by human rights violations, corruption, clientelism and 
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abuses of power, despite universal suffrage and multi-party elections (Schedler et al. 
1999: 2).  
 
There has also been increasing attention to the potential of decentralisation to deepen 
democracy through democratic local governance (Blair 2000; Posner 2003). The rationale 
is that decision making is more likely to be responsive to local needs the more it involves 
those directly affected by decisions, and that embedding decision making within strong 
webs of accountability that flow in all directions increases the probability of governance 
that benefits the poor, making such a regime both ‘more responsive to citizen desires and 
more effective in service delivery’ (Blair 2000: 21). Manor reports, however, that despite 
the assumption that decentralising decision making serves to enhance state 
responsiveness to the needs of the poor and popular control over decision making, he has 
‘yet to discover evidence of any case where local élites were more benevolent than those 
at higher levels’ (Manor 1999: 91). Where enforcement mechanisms complement 
processes for creating answerability, the situation may be different. In Bolivia, for 
example, vigilance committees are entitled to monitor local budgets and can wield a legal 
instrument called a denuncia against local councils. This means that there is a process by 
which central funds to the local council that has been denounced can be suspended. As 
with other strategies aimed at enhancing the accountability of public and private actors, 
the combinations of tactics that will make an impact depend, amongst other things, on the 
responsiveness of the state, the sensitivity of the issue in question and the prevailing 
political culture. 
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... To markets… 
 
Recent global trends, however, are bringing into question the appropriateness of this 
focus on holding governments to account for decisions and actions that result from 
bargains with, and the actions of, non-state and private actors. The rapid growth in cross-
border economic transactions in trade, production and finance has brought about changes 
in political authority at national and international levels and, as a result, transformed 
many traditional arenas of accountability. In the wake of globalisation and associated 
patterns of deregulation and liberalisation, global corporate power has gained increasing 
sway, leading to greater corporate influence over activities that traditionally have been 
the prerogative of states. With revenues that often dwarf the gross domestic products 
(GDPs) of many developing countries, transnational corporations (TNCs) are often more 
powerful than governments, and the mobility that allows them to locate their business in 
the most favourable regulatory environment gives them sufficient leverage to play one 
government off against another. We see from the chapters in this book on the pursuit of 
labour rights in the United States and Bangladesh that capital mobility also strongly and 
negatively impacts upon the ability of trade unions to hold corporations to account over 
the recognition of labour rights. As a result, it often seems that TNCs wield power 
without responsibility: they are as powerful as states, yet less accountable. As Vidal 
notes, ‘Corporations have never been more powerful, yet less regulated; never more 
pampered by government, yet never less questioned; never more needed to take social 
responsibility yet never more secretive…. To whom will these fabulously self-motivated, 
self-interested supranational bodies be accountable?’ (Vidal 1996: 263).  
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The imbalance between the rights and responsibilities of firms is also increasingly 
manifested at the global level where there is an imbalance between regulation for 
business rather than regulation of business (Newell 2001a). The entitlements and rights 
of corporations are enshrined in international agreements aimed at freeing up restrictions 
on investment. The attempt to negotiate a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, the 
conclusion by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) of the Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) accord and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
all provide evidence of this. Gill (1995) refers to this as the ‘new constitutionalism’, in 
which the rights of capital are affirmed, legally protected and upheld above those of 
states. Each of these agreements affords new rights to companies while circumscribing 
the powers of national and local authority over investors.  
 
Not only has this brought about a renegotiation of relations between state and market, but 
there is also some evidence of a transformation of relations between actors such as TNCs, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and international organisations. This has 
resulted in a more complex and dense set of obligations and responsibilities between 
different actors in development, creating both opportunities for the construction of new 
accountabilities and new accountability gaps. Accountability gaps can emerge where 
shifts of political authority take place, between state and market for example, without the 
creation of new accountability mechanisms. The way in which both the private sector and 
NGOs have become involved in the delivery of services that were traditionally the 
preserve of the state, such as health and education, has raised concerns about whether 
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these new service providers have the same incentives, or channels of access, to respond to 
public demands and complaints in the way expected of states. When private actors 
perform public functions in this way, the issue of responsiveness to the poor is 
heightened, because they are working to a different mandate: profit maximisation and not 
service delivery for all (Whitfield 2001).  
 
… to civil society 
 
Just as the private sector plays an increasingly privileged role in service delivery, so civil 
society organisations are increasingly used by development agencies as aid deliverers 
because they are thought to provide more accountable, effective and equitable services, in 
many areas, than public or private agencies. As a result, large amounts of aid are 
channelled through NGOs. The very popularity of NGOs among donors and publics, 
which helps to explain their exponential rise, creates its own accountability gaps, 
however. Where NGOs have formed global alliances in order to enhance their 
effectiveness, questions arise about the identity of the constituency – if any – to which 
they are answerable. There are concerns, too, over the potential of NGO activity to 
become disembedded once groups become less dependent on a traditional support base 
and work instead to global donor or campaign agendas, set and negotiated with other 
partners.  
 
Hence there has been a reappraisal of the role of NGOs, once the darlings of the 
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development world, as service delivers and agents of democratisation (Najam 1996; 
Edwards and Hulme 1995). While NGOs do not necessarily perform less effectively than 
other public or private organisations, they often perform less well than the popular image 
suggests (Edwards and Hulme 1995: 6). NGOs can be as susceptible as other institutions 
to the problems of corruption, cooptation, opportunism and political manoeuvring. The 
issue here is not only accountability gaps, but also the potential for inconsistent standards 
and expectations regarding the conduct and degree of answerability of public and private 
actors. On these grounds, the World Bank has been criticised for demanding far higher 
standards of accountability from governments than from the NGO and private actors that 
increasingly also provide ‘state’ services. 
 
The challenge of ensuring accountability is multiplied when political authority is shared, 
as it increasingly is, across a number of levels from the local to the national, the regional 
and the global. The term multi-level governance describes the layers of overlapping 
authority that characterise decision making in the current global system. The spectacular 
growth of supranational authorities and regionalism, with international regimes governing 
an increasingly broad spectrum of areas of social and economic life, add to this 
institutional complexity and potentially create further democratic deficits. The challenge, 
from a development point of view, is how to ensure that decisions that affect the lives of 
the poor, but are taken in arenas remote from those lives, remain responsive to local 
needs.  
 
It is clear from this discussion that traditional definitions of accountability are being 
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expanded to adjust to new realities. Indeed, many of the political and economic changes 
described in Chapter 1 have rendered increasingly permeable the categorisations of 
accountability described below. Blurred lines of authority, competing jurisdictions and 
shifting social expectations have produced messier and denser webs of accountability 
between states, market actors and civil society. The following sections explore 
accountability types: whether political, financial, social or civil, all are principally 
associated with a particular type of actor but also describe distinct approaches to, and 
practices of, accountability. For example, we see how financial accountability is 
increasingly demanded of private and civil society as well as state actors; how political 
accountability is no longer provided within the state but increasingly also by civil society 
actors acting as watchdogs of state action; and how civil accountability, traditionally 
pursued by pressure groups, is increasingly being sought by community-based groups in 
defence of their livelihood rights. Notions of accountability to whom and for what are 
continually evolving – a product of the coincidence of proliferating accountability gaps 
and an increasing sense in which, even if accountability is not a right, people have a right 
to claim it.  
 
Political accountability 
 
Traditional notions of political accountability are derived from the responsibilities of 
delegated individuals in public office to carry out specific tasks on behalf of citizens. It is 
this sense of accountability, in which rulers explain and justify actions to the ruled, that 
traditionally distinguished a democratic society from a tyrannical one. In the Athenian 
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state, this meant holding officials accountable for their actions; more modern notions of 
political accountability have focused on ministerial accountability and the ability of 
parliament to call the executive powers to account. Thus democratic accountability is 
characterised not only by elections to determine who runs the affairs of society, but also 
by the continuing obligation of these officials to explain and justify their conduct in 
public. Though accountability is traditionally seen as a retrospective account of past 
actions (ex post), more radical constructions involve actors making public their intended 
actions before they are taken, promoting public engagement through consultation and 
deliberation (ex ante) (Day and Klein 1987).  
 
In the modern state, with the growth of bureaucracies, the lines of political accountability 
have become more blurred, making traditional concepts more difficult to apply. 
Contemporary discussions of accountability have broadened to include both horizontal 
and vertical mechanisms of political accountability. Horizontal mechanisms amount to 
self-imposed accountability within the state machinery. Vertical accountability, on the 
other hand, is that which is demanded from below by citizens and civil society groups 
(Schacter 2000: 1). In this sense, horizontal accountability refers to the capacity of state 
institutions to check abuses by other public agencies and branches of government through 
checks and balances on the powers of the judiciary, executive and legislature. In reality it 
may also be exercised by anti-corruption bodies, auditors general, electoral and human 
rights commissions and other ombudsmen. To be effective, horizontal accountability 
needs to be buttressed by strong vertical accountability, in which citizens, mass media 
and civil associations are in a position to scrutinise public officials and government 
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practice in the ways suggested by approaches to social accountability discussed below.  
 
We noted above the centrality of mechanisms of enforceability to practicable notions of 
accountability. Different forms of accountability rely on different enforcement 
mechanisms, but accountability is only as effective as the mechanisms it employs, and 
‘inconsequential accountability is not accountability at all’ (Schedler et al. 1999: 17). To 
deliver answerability effectively, sanctions are key. Sanctions can be both ‘soft’ and 
‘hard’. Soft sanctions refer to tools aimed at bringing about change without the use of 
coercion. Moral appeals, expectations, exposure and embarrassment, and appeals to pride 
and responsibility are among these tools. Civil society scrutiny can play a key role here in 
exposing wrongdoing and non-compliance with commitments made by governments or 
industries. Without the ties to diplomatic routine and without having to face the costs of 
political fallout that prohibit public institutions from speaking out, NGOs can create and 
police accountability mechanisms that go far beyond what is conceivable in the realm of 
formal politics. As with all aspects of accountability, therefore, protest and exposure are 
key tools in enforcing compliance.  
 
A great deal of importance is also attached to the law as a mechanism for enforcing 
political accountability. The law can be seen as a political mechanism for defining rights, 
allocating responsibilities and thereby helping to construct prevailing notions of 
citizenship. This form of accountability seeks answerability and enforceability through 
the courts, a process that we examine in relation to South Africa (Chapter 3), India 
(Chapter 8) and the United States (Chapter 12), where rights have been violated and/or 
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compensation sought. Where the law governs access to key resources, determines 
economic entitlements and shapes the rules of participation in public life, it can be 
applied positively to create an enabling environment in which poorer groups can secure 
their rights.  
 
Yet the law is not a neutral vessel and legal processes are not insulated from political 
pressures. Law creation is always for someone, for some purpose, responsive to state 
needs or the concerns of well-organised and well-resourced political groups. Attempts to 
use the law to hold corporations to account for their social and environmental 
responsibilities have often failed because of state support for the corporations that are the 
subject of the suit or discrimination against the communities trying to bring the case, as 
we see in Chapter ?. As an accountability tool of the poor, the law has limitations and 
opportunities depending on the system in question. Countries such as India have a strong 
tradition of public interest litigation, for example. It should be noted, however, that basic 
resource constraints, lack of legal literacy and distrust of legal processes often conspire to 
dissuade poorer groups from using the legal system to seek redress (Newell 2001b). The 
perceived limits of these and other strategies by which the state is meant to hold itself to 
account have resulted in increasing interest in broader forms of social and civil 
accountability. 
 
Social accountability 
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Related in many ways to political accountability is the notion of social accountability 
(Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2002). Lent legitimacy by 
emerging rights-oriented discourses, social accountability explores the way in which 
citizen action, aimed at overseeing political authorities, is redefining the traditional 
concept of the relationship between citizens and their elected representatives. Social 
mobilisations, press reports and legal cases are the repertoires of protest that produce 
such forms of accountability. The targets are often election processes, government 
restrictions imposed on access to information and instances of police violence (Stanley 
2005). The aims are variously to tackle issues of citizen security, judicial autonomy and 
access to justice, electoral fraud and government corruption (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 
2002; Dodson and Jackson 2004). The strategies provide, in effect, extra sets of checks 
and balances on the proper conduct of government in the public interest, exposing 
instances of corruption, negligence and oversight that vertical forms of accountability are 
unlikely or even unable to address. Social forms of political control intend to go beyond 
the limitations of relying upon traditional mechanisms of accountability: elections; the 
separation of powers; and the checks and balances that exist, in theory, between state 
agencies. 
 
More radical notions of accountability might question the state-centred nature of such 
approaches, which (re)produce a reliance on the state as an agent of change. The 
emphasis is explicitly to explore the ways in which civil society ‘adds to the classic 
repertoire of electoral and constitutional institutions for controlling government’ 
(Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000: 149). To work, however, such strategies require a 
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responsive state that demonstrates a level of concern for what citizens or voters think and 
is willing to implement reforms aimed at pacifying those concerns. Social accountability 
mechanisms often explicitly aim at activating or reinforcing the operations of other 
agencies of horizontal accountability, again assuming their existence, effectiveness and 
willingness to pursue public interest agendas. Their aim, for example, is to 'trigger 
procedures in courts or oversight agencies that eventually lead to legal sanctions' 
(Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000: 151), to catalyse state-based mechanisms of 
enforceability. Rather than being effective in their own right, therefore, societal 
mechanisms need to pull other levers of change through the law or media.  
 
A problematic assumption in this regard relates not just to the limits of the law or of the 
critical capacity of the media to work in these ways, but to issues of the capacity of actors 
promoting social accountability to perform these watchdog functions on an ongoing and 
sustained basis. Besides issues of resourcing, there is an implied assumption that societal 
mechanisms provide a viable system for tracking and addressing instances of misconduct 
or acts of negligence. But what if the problems are systemic, deep-rooted, ingrained in 
the everyday administration of the state? The problem is then not one of temporary 
institutional failure, nor one of institutional failure at all, but of institutions working very 
well for those that benefit from prevailing concentrations of power, distributions of 
resources and institutional indifference or blindness towards the needs of poorer groups.  
 
If the problem is more fundamental in nature, we can expect less to be achieved by 
single-issue campaigns targeted at particular abuses of power, well-intentioned as those 
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may be, and in spite of their potential to draw attention to broader patterns of neglect. We 
see this in Chapter 9 of this volume, where environmental justice advocates claim that 
acts of environmental racism are not evidence of a breakdown in a decision-making 
process. Rather, they manifest a deliberate, state-endorsed strategy, one that works well 
for those who profit from the social and environmental externalities passed on to poorer 
groups. As Goetz and Jenkins claim more generally (2004: 7): 
 Many of the initiatives that profess to promote accountability target only very 'soft' 
aspects of accountability ... treating the structural difficulties of democratic systems as 
temporary glitches requiring the application of technical expertise. Such initiatives side-
step institutionalised anti-poor biases that prevent accountability institutions from 
recognising and responding to injustices that disproportionately, or even exclusively, 
affect marginalised groups. (Goetz and Jenkins 2004: 7)  
 
A further limitation of approaches to social accountability is their applicability to 
contexts in which the state tolerates and accommodates such forms of protest and 
criticism; where a free media exists, willing and prepared to engage in critical exposé 
journalism; and an accessible and functioning legal system operates, able to back citizen 
claims against the state with financial support and expertise. Such conditions could be 
said to apply to an increasing number of developed and developing countries, but in 
many settings they remain a distant prospect. Even in contexts where these basic 
conditions are met in theory, in practice barriers to accessing the media and the justice 
system continue to frustrate change. Hence, although Peruzzotti and Smulovitz claim that 
'The politics of social accountability has taken place under authoritarian contexts', they do 
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acknowledge that 
 
Under authoritarianism, the struggle for access to information becomes a precondition for 
any initiative oriented at controlling government behaviour. Authoritarianism also 
weakens the politics of social accountability in so far as it reduces the repertoire of 
institutional tools available to the citizenry for the exercise of control. (Peruzzotti and 
Smulovitz 2002: 226)  
 
Exploring the limitations of strategies of social accountability is not to undermine their 
importance in generating significant and much-needed checks and balances on the often 
arbitrary use of state power. Work on law and development, in particular, explores the 
conditions in which poorer and marginalised groups have been able to secure change 
through legal systems (Crook and Houtzager 2001; McClymont and Golub 2000) and this 
book cites a number of cases in which legal challenges have yielded important pro-poor 
outcomes. Similarly, the fact that social accountability is stronger on answerability than 
enforceability does not render it insignificant. As Peruzzotti and Smulovitz argue, ‘the 
fact that most societal mechanisms do not have mandatory effects does not mean that 
they cannot have important “material consequences”’ (2002: 227).  
 
Rather, raising such concerns about the possibilities of social accountability forms part of 
a generic concern articulated throughout this book to look at accountability in terms not 
defined exclusively by state power. Many of the chapters in this book explore the crucial 
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roles of community-based and civil society groups that plug accountability deficits in 
public institutions or address their lack of responsiveness to the needs of the poor by 
taking action directly, albeit sometimes in ways which invoke rights or entitlements in 
theory conferred by the state. The state is rarely absent in accountability struggles, 
therefore. The question is whether it always makes strategic sense for it to be the primary 
focus of campaign energies. Again, the answer has to depend on the goal of an 
accountability struggle and the extent to which change is contingent on reform in state 
practice. 
 
Financial accountability  
 
Managerial and financial approaches to accountability describe specific practices of 
accountability, traditionally applied to states but increasingly also to the private sector 
and civil society. Managerial accountability generally refers to the answerability of those 
with delegated authority for carrying out tasks according to agreed performance criteria. 
This less explicitly political form of accountability is concerned with inputs, outputs and 
outcomes; monitoring expenditure as agreed and according to the rules; and making sure 
that the processes and courses of action are carried out efficiently to achieve intended 
results (Day and Klein 1987: 27). If political accountability focuses on questions of 
institutional engineering, managerial accountability focuses on accountancy. Broader 
accountability challenges in such conceptualisations run the risk of being reduced to 
performative functions: institutional planning and the assembling of incentives to 
motivate rational actors. Hence, for health, standards, benchmarks, practice guidelines 
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and compliance mechanisms are key to improving ‘service utilisation and client 
satisfaction’ (ibid.: 372). In a simple logical sequence between incentives and outcomes, 
‘accountability is achieved through the application of the laws, standards and procedures 
these frameworks put in place, which shape the incentives for various actors to comply’ 
(ibid.: 372). 
 
In its origins, financial accountability can be distinguished from political accountability 
by virtue of its proclaimed status as a neutral, technical exercise essentially concerned 
with keeping accurate accounts, with using the tools of auditing, budgeting and 
accounting to track and report on the allocation, disbursement and utilisation of financial 
resources. Current notions of financial accountability have expanded beyond the 
balancing of public books to the management of resources, shifting from economy to 
efficiency. Fiscal accountability mechanisms and auditing practices are continuing to 
evolve and expand, moving away from being strictly accounts-based to incorporating 
new indicators of financial integrity and performance. The recent emergence of social 
and environmental auditing practices, discussed below, represents this shift.  
Managerial accountability has also expanded to include notions of administrative 
accountability. In the arena of public service delivery, new management approaches 
aimed at enhancing financial accountability can generate competing accountability 
demands and conflicting trade-offs. Efficient performance of services, demonstrated 
through ever more elaborate and transparent systems of accounting, may be at odds with 
the need to widen the access and availability of services to poorer groups. Such conflicts 
are most visible in those public services of greatest importance to the poor, such as 
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health, education or the supply of water (Paul 1992). In this sense, while the purposes of 
accountability can overlap, they can also yield tensions. Brinkerhoff notes that 
‘accountability for control, with its focus on uncovering malfeasance and allocating 
“blame”, can conflict with accountability for improvement, which emphasises managerial 
discretion and embracing error as a source of learning’ (2003: xii). 
 
It is in the corporate sector, perhaps, that we see the clearest evidence of an audit culture 
taking root, combining elements of managerial and financial accountability. The range of 
indicators of corporate performance has been broadened, in some cases to include social 
and environmental factors. Clear performance indicators are difficult to quantify, 
however, stretching conventional auditing techniques that rest on the assumption that 
‘what can’t be counted doesn’t count’, but their increased emphasis does indicate how 
auditing processes are responsive to evolving demands for the accountability of actors.  
Increasing numbers of social and environmental reports and externally verified 
statements provide evidence of the attempt by corporate management to demonstrate a 
commitment to the public at large (Beloe 1999), though it remains the case that in global 
terms very few companies make such data publicly available. Similarly, though the 
indicators of social and environmental reporting are becoming more numerous and 
sophisticated, there are as yet few standard formats reflecting the type of information 
companies choose to report, or how that information is collected, analysed and presented. 
Because of this, a variety of organisations and initiatives are attempting to standardise 
social and environmental reporting procedures to enable stakeholders to compare 
companies more easily across sectors and regions. Standards such as SA8000 (established 
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in 1997 by Social Accountability International), and AA1000 (developed by the Institute 
of Social and Ethical Accountability in 1999) incorporate frameworks to improve 
performance and the quality of assessments.  
 
Heightened public interest in questions of corporate accountability and responsibility has 
forced (some) companies to go beyond declarations of good intent and the self-
enforcement of codes of conduct and to involve third-party consultants and accreditation 
agencies in the verification of their commitments. There has been a role for consultancy 
firms such as Ernst and Young and KMPG, verifying company claims once site 
inspections and interviews with employees have taken place. But cross-checking of these 
assessments rarely takes place and questions have been asked about their thoroughness 
and effectiveness. When there is pressure for a speedy audit, companies are given notice 
of inspections and interviews with workers take place in the work environment, where 
they may be less free to speak out (O’Rourke 1997).  
 
The involvement of private auditors in verifying compliance also raises the question of 
who audits the auditors. Questions have been asked about the independence and 
commitment of consultancy firms, such as KPMG, since they perform these roles for 
profit and are paid by the companies whose activities they are meant to be monitoring 
(Simms 2002). The recent corporate governance scandals in the US involving 
corporations such as Enron and WorldCom have served to focus attention on the 
unhealthy degree of collusion between companies and those they employ to oversee their 
accounts. In this context, second-order accountability is an important issue: ‘how can we 
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hold institutions of accountability accountable themselves?’ (Schedler et al. 1999: 25).  
 
Unsurprisingly, this emphasis on accountancy has extended to civil society groups in 
development, given their heightened role in aid delivery. With regard to development 
projects, often the simplest mechanism by which an NGO can be held to account is 
accounting for expenditure. To demonstrate this, measures and indicators are needed, yet 
few agreed performance standards are available. Indicators of quality of organisational 
performance are rare, with most assessments favouring short-term visible results and 
evaluations that emphasise control and fiscal responsibility. The types of appraisal 
procedures insisted on by donors favour ‘accountancy rather than accountability’, audit 
rather than learning (Edwards and Hulme 1995: 13). Given tendencies towards loose 
oversight by a board, periodic elections of officers, minimalist reports of activities and 
summary financial records, Scholte suggests such 'pro forma accountability mainly 
addresses the bureaucratic requirements of governments and donors.... Thus in civil 
society, just as much as in governance and market circles, formal accountability may well 
fall short of effective accountability' (2005: 107).  
 
Towards civil accountability?  
 
The conceptualisations above fail to capture an increasingly important type of 
accountability; civil accountability. Strategies of civil accountability are non-state, often 
informal and distinct in form from political, social and financial accountability (see Table 
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1.1, page 00). They most closely resemble strategies of social accountability, but are less 
focused on achieving change in the state as an end itself and towards this end adopt 
different activist repertoires. Sometimes citizen action takes the form of problem solving 
as a self-help strategy, often in the absence of, or because of, a prior state intervention. 
Efforts to engage citizens in the management of water resources, explored in Chapter 4, 
are an example of this. At other times, the aim is raising awareness or improving 
consciousness about the ways in which accountability deficits frustrate the development 
prospects of the poor – as in the case of consciousmess raising through theatre in Nigeria, 
discussed in Chapter 10. Innovative participatory methodologies bring new citizen 
knowledge to the fore to challenge existing approaches to regulation. Participatory health 
assessments or pollution monitoring by citizens in India, discussed in Chapter 8, provide 
examples of these types of strategy in practice. 
 
Building on the argument of the previous chapter that accountability is often a means to 
an end, by specifying the aim of a struggle it becomes easier to comprehend the strategies 
groups adopt to secure those ends. The strategic use of accountability tools shifts with 
time, so that it is unsurprising to find groups employing simultaneously a diverse range of 
tactics. In Mexico we find evidence of groups moving from registering dissent through 
cutting off water supplies to more proactive engagement in water management 
alternatives (Chapter 4). In practice then, multiple and hybrid forms of accountability are 
sought and practised by social actors working within available spaces and beyond them to 
construct new arenas of engagement, fusing strategies in combinations that make sense in 
the pursuit of diverse and shifting goals. This partly reflects a reading of existing political 
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opportunity structures. As Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley note (2003: 4): ‘State 
institutional arrangements … can influence whether people turn to collective or 
individual, and formal or informal strategies to secure or protect social rights and to 
redress violations thereof.’ 
 
When such formal channels fail to operate or perform poorly, aggrieved citizens often 
resort to alternative mechanisms of redress. Arenas for the contestation of rights and 
duties can be created by movements and citizen groups where new spaces for 
accountability can be constituted. Indeed, as Goetz and Jenkins note, in many cases it is  
shortcomings in conventional accountability systems – secrecy in auditing, ineffective 
policy reviews in legislatures, the electorate’s difficulty in sending strong signals to 
decision makers between elections, excessive delays in courts and inadequate sanctions 
for failure to apply administrative rules or respect standards [that] have created pressure 
for better channels for vertical information flows and stronger accountability mechanisms 
between state agents and citizens. (Goetz and Jenkins 2001: 2–3). 
 
Sometimes activists imitate official accountability procedures in order to raise issues and 
highlight the limitations of existing mechanisms. The public hearings described in 
Chapter ? of the book are an example in this regard, where formal hearings are called for, 
but often not undertaken, and communities and activists have sought to construct their 
own hearings for dealing with accountability claims. While to some extent mocking state 
procedures by staging them in informal ways, such experiments can yield institutional 
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change. Often accountability mechanisms are fashioned in ways that seek to engage state 
actors without mimicking state-based accountability tools. Strategies of citizen water 
management in Mexico described in Chapter 4 aim to secure water supply in a context of 
acute conflict without resort to state mechanisms of redress.  
 
Such experiments in accountability politics are often aimed at challenging prevailing 
political cultures of secrecy, official arrogance and institutional unresponsiveness. In so 
doing, they often contest the very purposes for which accountability tools are invoked. 
The ‘new accountability agenda’ includes the use of such experiments, whereby 
disenfranchised groups are provided with ‘opportunities to operationalise rights and to 
shift the terrain of governance from technical solutions to a more immediate concern with 
social justice’ (Goetz and Jenkins 2004: 3). The challenge is to move from accountability 
as spectacle, as it is practised in these events, useful as they are, to accountability as 
norm, a routine and mundane feature of everyday decision making.  
 
There is clearly a difference between accountability that can be created passively and that 
which is produced actively. Passive accountability implies that the authority to act on 
behalf of others is conferred on leaders of communities, heads of NGOs, and, of course, 
governments. A mandate is given such that continual approval is not required for each 
and every decision that is made on behalf of a broader political community. This is the 
minimalist notion of democracy described by the term ‘delegative democracy’ 
(O’Donnell 1994). It is best represented in notions of political and managerial 
accountability, described above, which emphasise the self-regulating ability of state, 
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private and civil society actors. Active accountability, on the other hand, is that which is 
continually (re) negotiated, where demands have to be vocalised and where closure is not 
reached on how accountability should be exercised and on whose behalf. This assumes 
both a right and a capacity to articulate accountability demands. It resonates more 
strongly with the notions of social and civil accountability where the focus is respectively 
on monitoring the state’s ability to self-regulate or attempting to reproduce, compensate 
for or mimic state action in its absence. There is an important balance to strike, therefore, 
between building citizens’ capacities to articulate rights and the capabilities of political-
economic institutions to respond and be held to account (Gaventa and Jones 2002).  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that while accountability is an increasingly crucial reference 
point in development debates, its use in diverse discourses remains loose and under-
specific as a result of the essentially contested nature of the term and the broad range of 
political claims it can be used to advance. This, indeed, is the whole point of our enquiry 
into the relationship between rights, resources and accountability. In understanding these 
processes, we have placed power centrally: power to define accountability, and power to 
create and enforce the mechanisms of accountability. We have seen throughout the 
discussion how power operates at different levels, reinforcing itself through discourse, 
process and the actions of actors. We noted a complex interplay between the way 
narratives of accountability construct rights and obligations (and notions of citizenship in 
so doing) and the way strategies of accountability generate new expectations about the 
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appropriate conduct of others, contesting or reinforcing prevailing notions of 
accountability. In understanding predominant applications of accountability, we 
emphasised the importance of the historical and material circumstances to the 
construction of rights and entitlements to accountability. It is to be expected, therefore, 
that future struggles for accountability will both reflect and help to redefine prevailing 
historical processes and material changes. 
 
Inevitably, such a broad overview has raised as many questions as it has provided 
adequate answers to the key accountability questions we set out at the start of the chapter. 
Hard questions remain about whether accountability makes a difference, how much 
difference it makes, and for whom. As Chapter ? on struggles over labour rights makes 
clear, there are social costs associated with accountability struggles. Despite claims to the 
contrary, they are neither win-win for all concerned, nor cost-free. In many of the 
contexts explored in this book, indeed, we have seen how people risk their lives in the 
face of violence and intimidation to protest abuses of power and advance accountability 
claims. More accountability may ultimately contribute both to the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of political institutions, but that hope must be demonstrated, not assumed. The 
question for many of the actors engaged in the accountability struggles described in this 
book is not what accountability does for those institutions that already wield power, but 
what it can do for the victims of institutional inaction, political oversight, economic 
marginalisation and overt repression. 
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